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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 







ASSEM A. ABULKHAIR, 
 




GOOGLE, LLC; LAWRENCE EDWARD PAGE;  




On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-07217) 
District Judge:  Honorable Esther Salas 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 4, 2021 
 
 
Before: AMBRO, PORTER and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
 
















Assem Abulkhair appeals pro se from the District Court’s order, entered 
December 4, 2019, denying his motion to “restore” his previously adjudicated civil 
action.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm that order. 
I. 
In 2017, Abulkhair filed a pro se complaint in the District Court against Google 
LLC (“Google”) and its two co-founders.  The complaint “revolved around allegations 
that [the defendants] tampered with, blocked access to, and ultimately disabled a free 
email account that [Abulkhair] had obtained from Google in 2014.”  Abulkhair v. Google 
LLC, 738 F. App’x 754, 756 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam).  “In light of these allegations, 
Abulkhair sought ‘not less than’ $100 billion in damages and various other relief.”  Id.  
Google subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6).  In March 2018, the District Court granted that motion 
and dismissed the complaint, in its entirety, without prejudice to Abulkhair’s ability to 
file an amended complaint within 45 days.  But instead of filing an amended complaint, 
Abulkhair chose to file a notice of appeal challenging the District Court’s dismissal order. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




We exercised jurisdiction over that appeal, noting that the District Court’s 
dismissal order constituted a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because Abulkhair had 
not filed an amended complaint within the time provided by the District Court.  See 
Abulkhair, 738 F. App’x at 756 n.1 (citing Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 
851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992)).  We then summarily affirmed that dismissal order.  See id. at 
756-57.  In doing so, we found unpersuasive Abulkhair’s argument that the presiding 
District Judge should have recused herself.  See id. at 757 n.3.  Abulkhair later petitioned 
for a writ of certiorari, but the Supreme Court denied that petition in March 2019. 
In November 2019, Abulkhair returned to the District Court and filed a document 
titled “Motion to Restore Case.”  In that two-page motion, he appeared to reiterate 
allegations and arguments from his complaint and appeal.  Additionally, he noted that his 
complaint had been dismissed without prejudice, and he requested that the case “be 
restored by a new qualified judge.”  (Dist. Ct. docket # 24, at 2.)  On December 4, 2019, 
the presiding District Judge entered an order denying Abulkhair’s motion.  She explained 
that, to the extent that the motion could be construed as requesting relief under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60, that filing was untimely and “fails to raise any of the six 
enumerated grounds warranting such relief.”  (Dist. Ct. Order entered Dec. 4, 2019, at 2 
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6)).)  She further explained that, to the extent that the 
motion could be construed as requesting some other form of relief, such relief was not 




 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review 
the District Court’s December 4, 2019 order for abuse of discretion.  See Coltec Indus., 
Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 2002) (reviewing denial of Rule 60(b) 
motion under this standard); see also Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 
224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (reviewing denial of motion to recuse under this 
standard). 
 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a district court may relieve a 
party from a final judgment for the following reasons:   
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;  
 
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable 
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);  
 
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing 
party;  
 
(4) the judgment is void;  
 
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has 
been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively 
is no longer equitable; or  
 
(6) any other reason that justifies relief. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see also United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that “a Rule 60(b) motion may not be used as a substitute for an appeal”).  
 
5 
We agree with the District Court that none of those reasons is present in this case,1 and 
that Abulkhair’s “Motion to Restore Case” failed to establish that he was entitled to any 
other relief.2  Furthermore, there was no reason for the presiding District Judge to recuse 
herself from ruling on that motion.  See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (setting forth standards for 
recusal). 
In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s December 4, 2019 order.3
 
1 We need not decide whether Abulkhair’s “Motion to Restore Case” constituted an 
untimely Rule 60(b) motion. 
 
2 As indicated above, although the District Court’s March 2018 order dismissed 
Abulkhair’s complaint without prejudice to his ability to file an amended complaint 
within 45 days, he elected not to take advantage of that opportunity.  The mere fact that 
the March 2018 order used the phrase “without prejudice” did not give Abulkhair the 
right to reopen his case more than 18 months later. 
 
3 We hereby grant Appellees’ request for leave to file an appendix consisting of a copy of 
Abulkhair’s “Motion to Restore Case” and the District Court’s December 4, 2019 order.   
